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Whole Farm Income Insurance in a Canadian Context 
Abstract 
This paper employs mean-variance and mean-skewness optimization to investigate farmers’ crop 
choices under Gross Revenue Insurance (GRIP), Whole Farm Income Insurance, the Canadian 
Agricultural Income Stabilization program, and its modified 2008 program AgrInvest. To our 
knowledge this paper is the first to fully consider the endogenous optimization of whole farm 
insurance in a farm optimization model. The results indicate that farmers will alter farm plans 
significantly in response to the type of insurance offered and the level of subsidy. Farmers will 
take on production risks that they would not otherwise take and this risk taking behavior is 
exacerbated by subsidy. 
 
Key Words: Agricultural Insurance, Skewness Maximization, Mean-Variance, Farm Income 
Insurance, GRIP, CAIS, AgrInvest 






The advent of modern risk management in agriculture is increasingly becoming focused 
on whole farm income insurance. By whole farm income insurance it is meant that a single 
policy is provided which covers the covariate risk of jointly produced farm crop and livestock 
enterprises. It is a separate and distinct approach to those farm safety nets that focus on crop 
specific insurance, price insurance and stabilization, or enterprise revenue insurance. 
Explorations into income insurance in Canada and the United States have been conducted by 
Turvey and Amanor-Boadu 1989;  Hennessy, Babcock Hayes 1997, and Hennessy, Saak and 
Babcock (2003) and in a European context by Meuwissen, Huirne, and Skees (2003) but none, 
for a variety of reasons,  are satisfactory from an economic point of view. The most serious 
deficiency, and that which is most explored in this paper, is the endogeneity of  the insurance 
decision on crop choices. An exception is discussion of  whole farm income insurance in the 
United States discussed in a very thorough review by Dismukes and Durst (2006). There they 
recommend a whole farm approach that does not require savings account balances such as 
Canada’s CAIS program or income insurance savings in Australia but rather a whole farm 
approach that is based on portfolio indemnities and premiums. This is along the lines of the AGR 
and AGR-Lite programs in the United States which they describe as whole farm revenue 
insurance.  
Nonetheless there has been scant research done on either the design of whole farm 
income insurance, how income insurance would affect enterprise selection, the effect of subsidy 
on crop choices, or the impact income insurance might have in terms of decoupling and World 
Trade Organization guidelines. With these problems in mind, the purpose of this paper is to 
investigate farm portfolio choice under whole farm income insurance plans. The particular plans 
include a gross revenue plan as a point of comparison, but the real focus is on a generalized 
indemnity-based whole farm plan stylized to the AGR program in the United States and the 
CAIS and AgrInvest policies in Canada. Canadian data is used for a typical farm in Manitoba.  
The next section is focused on policy design and model specification. This is followed by a   4
discussion of the data sources, Monte Carlo simulations, and optimization results and 
conclusions.  
Perhaps one of the most important outcome of this paper is a better understanding of  
endogenous choice in portfolio selection under a whole farm insurance regime. This is of course 
the fundamental problem facing policy makers and the consequence of choice have far reaching 
implications into matters of trade, market distortions, wealth accumulation, asset capitalization 
and so on. Yet our understanding to date is quite rudimentary. For example the portfolio models 
of  Turvey and Amanor-Boadu (1989)  or Hennessy, Saak and Babcock (2003) take the crop mix 
as exogenous. The notion that farmers will incorporate the parameters of insurance (allowable 
coverage and premium subsidy) into their crop planning strategy which in turn will 
simultaneously affect the cost of insurance and benefits of subsidy is not a trivial one, especially 
in the context of decoupling and the WTO (Baffes and de Gorter, 2004). The key factor is that 
the rules for eligibility and the criteria upon which payments are based upon originally (like the 
volume of production or use of input or status of a farmer) cannot change once the decoupled 
program is set in place (Baffes and de Gorter 2004)
1.  Care is required. At one level it would 
appear that if farmers paid fully an actuarial price, a production response would be decoupled 
because neither the policy or its benefits is targeted to any particular crop. Where the problem 
comes about is when tax payer funds are used to subsidize the insurance. If premiums are 
subsidized there will be an income effect that could favour the inclusion of crops in the final 
farm portfolio that would not have ordinarily been considered, even though the policy was not 
targeted to the favored crops.  Examining how whole farm income insurance can affect farm 
enterprise selection is therefore important not only in the context of agricultural economics but in 
the practical matters of  agricultural policy and trade.  
A second problem this paper resolves is in modeling the complexity of whole farm 
income insurance. The problem of modeling whole farm income with endogenous premium 
determination has not to the writer’s knowledge been solved previously. In this paper we show 
how to structure a mathematical programming model to account for this complexity. The third 
                                                 
1 We will leave aside in this paper the implications of decoupled programs and government payments in general on 
other possible distortions such as land values. These effects are discussed elsewhere in Weersink et al, (1999); 
Goodwin et al (2003); However it is easy to understand how the expected wealth effect of subsidy can affect land 
values. Looking ahead to Table 7 the expected indemnity for Income insurance with a $185,000 target and  a 50% 
subsidy implies  an expected  gain in wealth of $19,219 . Spread over 1,000 acres the simple capitalized value of 
$19.219/acre at 10% implies a land benefit of $192.19/acre.   5
problem we contribute to is related to the second and that deals specifically with how to price 
whole farm insurance. First we must distinguish whole farm insurance from say crop-specific 
gross revenue assurance applied to all crops in a portfolio because it explicitly includes cross-
enterprise covariances and other dependencies (such as crop rotations).  
A fourth problem arises in terms of expected utility. The concern here is that not all 
farmers will behave alike. Differing degrees of risk aversion or varying preference for reduced 
risk or positive skewness can affect crop decisions under a whole farm insurance plan.  In this 
paper farm plans are optimized under the insurance policies using both a variance minimizing 
objective and a skewness maximizing objective. These models correspond to second degree 
stochastic dominance (see Hader and Russel 1969; Ogryczak and Ruszczynski 2001) and third 
degree stochastic dominance respectively (see Whitemore 1970 and Levy 1992). We rely on a 
theorem by Gotoh and Konno (2000) who show that an optimization model that maximizes the 
third moment of the probability distribution is also third degree stochastic dominant. This is of 
particular relevance for problems in risk management in which derivative products or insurance 
either skew probabilities towards more favourable outcomes, or truncate the lower partial 
moments entirely. This paper therefore explores the problem of income insurance with both a 
quasi mean variance approach (in the sense that multivariate normality is not imposed) that 
minimizes portfolio risk, and a mean skewness model that maximizes the skewness of the 
resulting portfolio. We are unaware of any other study that has actually maximized skewness in a 
portfolio problem as we do here. We find the solutions strikingly different and conclude that 
when it comes to incorporating risk contingencies in a portfolio model, mean variance cannot be 
assumed as a matter of course.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss expected utility 
and rationalize our use of mean-Variance (E-V) and mean-Skewness (E-S) optimizations. This is 
followed with mathematical descriptions of the income insurance and gross revenue insurance 
models. The data sources and use of Monte Carlo simulation of state-space is then provided, and 
the results of the models and conclusions follow. 
 
Whole Farm Income, Expected Utility and Stochastic Dominance 
The use of stochastic dominance to investigate agricultural crop insurance decisions is 
not foreign to the literature (Wilson et al 2009) and shows that crop insurance decisions are   6
based on a number of factors related to risk including the price of insurance. In this section we 
examine first, second and third degree stochastic dominance (FSD,SSD, TSD) in the context of  
expected utility, choices under uncertainty, and the effect of insurance on these choices. The 
mean variance model excludes higher moments of utility beyond mean and variance and is 
generally restricted to the class of quadratic or negative exponential utility if the joint returns are 
at least approximately multivariate normal. It is naïve to assume that all farmers have 
homogenous preferences or are restricted to a particular quality of utility. Furthermore there is a 
lack of clarity in determining utility preferences when joint distributions are fully truncated or by 
the nature of insurance reduced in the lower partial moments.  If we consider a more flexible 
class of utility with  () ( ) ( ) '0 , ' '0 ' ' '0 U U and U ππ π ≥≤ ≥  then we can provide further 
investigation when decision makers have a preference for positive skewness. This originates with 
a Taylor series expansion around the expected utility of profits, π ,  ( ) EUπ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦; 




E U U E E higher order terms
ππ
π π ππ ππ =+ − + − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
This also represents a much broader spectrum of utility in which risk aversion can be 
decreasing, constant or increasing in π , but more generally it is assumed that  () ''' 0 U π ≥  implies 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. (1) holds surely for negative exponential utility and weakly for 
power or logarithmic utility (Krause and Litzenberg 1976; Bawa 1975). It has also been 
suggested that  () ''' 0 U π ≥  implies a preference for positive skewness but how general this 
conclusion is has been questioned by Brockett and Kahane (1992). Nonetheless, the link between 
() ''' 0 U π ≥  and skewness identified by Arditti (1967) and Tsiang (1972), experimentally by 
Alderfer and Bierman (1970) and  empirically by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) appears to be 
consistent with observed behavior, that is a preference for higher return ( () '0 U π ≥ ), and 
aversion to variance ( () '' 0 U π ≤ ) and a preference for skewness ( ( ) ''' 0 U π ≥ ).  
The general belief is that the three elements of (1) are not mutually exclusive; that it is 
normally assumed that the utility maximizer prefers more income to less AND prefers less 
variance to more AND prefers more skewness to less (or equivalently a smaller lower partial 
moment OR a larger higher partial moment). These combine to establish the necessary 
conditions for the ordering of risky prospects,  and we label them accordingly: A manager who   7
ignores risk and skewness is labeled as risk neutral; one who ignores skewness is a risk 
minimizer; one who includes all is a skewness maximizer. The precedence matters in the general 
expected utility model, for we would not ordinarily consider a preference for positive skewness 
if positive skewness comes at the expense of higher variance. This can be problematic for not all 
classes of probability distributions can preserve the ordering of mean and variance while altering 
skewness. The surgical removal of probabilities from the central core of the probability 
distribution and transplantation to the tails by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)  and Kroll and Levy 
(1988) is illustrative of these complexities. Alternatively the SSD rule from Porter (1974) claims 
that among prospects with equal means a prospect with higher left-distribution semivariance will 
be least preferred as a necessary but not sufficient condition. It is not sufficient because it is 
entirely possible that the same distribution could be preferred if, for example, when measured 
relative to a target the right-distribution semivariance is considerably higher (see also Levy 
1992). 
More formally we are considering the class of third degree stochastic dominant solutions 
which minimally contain all orderings of first and second degree stochastic dominance in the set. 
By the general proofs of stochastic dominance (see for example Hadar and Russel (1971), 
Whitemore (1970), and Gotoh and Kanno (2000)) orderings that are second order stochastic 
dominant are also third order stochastic dominant, but not all third degree stochastic dominant 
orderings are second degree stochastic dominant. On this basis theorem 5.2 of Gotoh and Kanno 






















has a solution that is  TSD semi-efficient (that is, when evaluated at equivalent target income 
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What Gotoh and Kanno’s theorem suggests is that if we substitute the standard definition of 
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in the optimization models to be presented below, the solutions are TSD efficient if the variance 
of the first is less than or equal to the variance of the second
2. This rule has been established by 
Whitmore (1970) as being necessary but not sufficient. In our model we do not impose the 
constraint  () () 21 KK σσ ≤  because as a tautology it would place an unnecessary restriction on 
the upper bound of the positively skewed distribution we seek. By tautology we mean that 
having already established the minimum variance frontier the imposition of the constraint would 
do no more than ensure that the E-S skewness frontier lies on all points along the E-V frontier. 
Rather, it is far more interesting to optimize without the constraint and check to determine 
whether  () () 21 KK σσ ≤  occurs naturally. Importantly, while  ( )( ) 21 KK σσ ≤  is a necessary 
condition for the solution to (2) to be preferred to (3) it is not sufficient. Therefore a violation of 
() () 21 KK σσ ≤  does not exclude the possibility that the portfolio (2) is preferred to portfolio 
(3)
3. Skewness preference is therefore critical in terms of how farmers will respond to the income 
insurance policies. In an insurance world there are two things going on. First, insurance is 
purchased to eliminate downside risk, leaving upside risk intact. It may well be the case that 
                                                 
2 We are however cautious that Gotoh and Kanno’s theorem does not explicitly consider skewness as defined by (4) 
(in comparison to the ordinary third moment in (2)) nor does their proof explicitly address the issue of truncated 
distributions, although their proof does assume that utility preference under the stochastic dominance criteria is 
distribution free. Levy (1982) does provide a set of dominance rules for the case of the normal distribution that hold 
also for lower partial moment truncation (Levy 1982, fn 1) that do not appear to contradict the theorem. Nonetheless 
our results are reassuring in that our model, even with the whole farm insurance structure, is consistent with their 
theorem. See fn 9 which shows that the 
3 σ  solution as defined by Gotoh and Kanno results in a slightly different 
solution than the one used in the optimization, and that the 
3 σ  solutions are identical to optimizations that 
maximize indemnity.  
3 In other words, by not restricting the set of feasible solutions to satisfy the necessary conditions we can expand the 
set to include higher order moments consistent with a utility preference for skewness. The reasoning is that the term   
can take on either positive or negative values. Maximization therefore places a preference on large positive 
deviations and this could occur at the expense of higher variance and downside risk. The choice is that in probability 
there is a greater chance of a large positive outcome than a variance measure might provide.   9
insurance premiums under a preference for skewness will be higher than for a risk minimizer. 
Second, if insurance is subsidized and it becomes less costly to insure greater amounts of 
downside risk, then farmers may well make choices accordingly. This is of course a purpose of 
insurance; that farmers can make choices with insurance that they would otherwise not make
4. At 
full premium this would not constitute a moral hazard but with subsidized premiums a type of 
moral hazard can be expected which could lead to higher premiums.  
But what of the current choices that farmers face between the mutually exclusive options 
of operating a farm without income insurance, or participating in an income insurance program? 
To start define  () f π  as the probability distribution of farm portfolio profit without participation 
in income insurance and () F π  its cumulative distribution function. Likewise define  ( ) g π as the 
(ex post) distribution of farm profits with the insurance in place and  ( ) G π its cumulative 
distribution function. In this context  ( ) g π  is a transformation of  ( ) f π . Next, the common 
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where  Z  is an insurance coverage level and θ  is the probability of receiving an insurance 
indemnity  Z π −  for any  Z π < . Note also that the integrals are of the Stieltjes-Lebesques class 
with  () aM i n π ≤  and  () bM a x π ≥  for either  ( ) g π  or  ( ) f π . Now suppose that  Z ν θ =  is an 
actuarial premium charge against the insurance. The subsidized cost is ( ) 1 δ ν −  where δ  is a 




1 1( ) ( )
bb
Za Z fd fd
δν
δν θ δν π π π π π π
+−
+− +− + ≥ ∫∫  
for  10 δ ≥≥ and holding with strict equality when  1 δ = . Adjusting the integrand (e.g. 
() 1 b δ ν +− ) captures the fact that the distribution function shifts to the right when the premium 
is less than actuarially fair. If an administrative load is added so that  1 u δ ≥>  then (7) fails and 
the insurance policy will not dominate the base case by FSD. Of course in many industries an 
administrative load is added and insurance is still purchased because insurance reduces or 
                                                 
4 This is also consistent with Baumol’s (1963) argument that reducing the bounds of the lower confidence limits will 
expand the opportunity set .   10
eliminates the lower partial moments below base coverage. Thus 10 δ ≥≥ is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for SSD. The SSD claim is generally interpreted in terms of portfolio 
variance.  We proceed accordingly. The variance without insurance is 
(8)  () ( ) () ( ) () ( )
22 2 2 bZ Z
f aa a f d x fd fd ππ π σ π μπ π μπ ππ μπ π =− =− +− ∫∫∫ . 
When income insurance  () F π  is truncated: 
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or 
(10)  () () () () () ( ) ()
( )
()
22 1 2 2
1 11
b
g xx f Z Zx f x d x
δν
δν σ θμ δ ν μ δ ν σ
+−
+− = − +− + − +− ≤ ∫ . 
Eq (10) will hold for all cases in which 10 δ ≥≥ but there will be some 
* 1 δ >  for which (10) 
does not hold. Generally we can assume that the public provision of agricultural insurance will 
be priced so that (9) holds to be true in most if not all instances. We can also see the 
insufficiency of the condition 10 δ ≥≥; There will be some range, 
* 1 δδ >> , for which (10) is 
true but for which (7) is false. That is, portfolio variance will be less than the base case while the 
expected profits are also less than the base case. Thus one cannot say that in all cases income 
insurance will dominate the base case by SSD as a matter of course, but as suggested above, the 
current policy regime of subsidized income insurance suggests that beyond the theoretical world 
whole farm income insurance will be preferred to no insurance. 
With truncated (or significantly reduced) variance and expected profits equal to or better 
than the base case there will be a natural increase in the skewness of  ( ) f x . This is most often 




f a f d π σ π μ ππ =− ∫ . 
and with agricultural insurance (assuming for simplicity that  1 δ = ) it is 
(12)  () ()
33 3 () ()
Zb
gx aZ Z fd fd π σμππ πμ ππ =− + − ∫∫ . 
 
Assuming that  0 Z π μ −≤  (that is portfolio coverage is less than or equal to the mean) the 
reduction in 
3
f σ  is   11
(13)  () ()
33 3 () ()
ZZ
aa Z fd fd ππ σ μπ π π μ π π Δ=− − − ∫∫ . 
If  Z π μ =  then  ()
3 3 () 0
a fd
π μ
π σπ μ π π Δ= − − > ∫  but if Z a = , 
3 0 σ Δ = . Thus for any Z a >  the 
resulting distribution of  () gxwill always be more positively skewed than   () f π . With lower 
variance (Eq 10) and higher expected income (Eq 7) almost certain to be true with the public 
provision of income insurance, we can conclude with reasonable (but not perfect) certainty that 
the necessary conditions for whole farm insurance to dominate the base case by TSD will be 
satisfied. Importantly, since we have imposed no restrictions on the distribution of  ( ) f π  then 
TSD dominance will hold for virtually any probability distribution that is continuous and locally 
differentiable or approximately so.  This leads to the problem of endogeneity discussed in the 
introduction. It is understood that the distribution of profits is conditional on the choice and 
weighting of crops grown and this will impact both the range of indemnity and the cost of 
insurance. It is entirely feasible that the dominance of the insured distribution over the uninsured 
distribution will encourage some farmers to maximize skewness even if that comes at an increase 
in downside risk and insurance premium. 
 
 
Optimization Models for Whole Farm Insurance 
 
This study uses two variants of the mean-variance and mean-skewness models. The first 
model is used to optimize a base case with no insurance as well as the enterprise specific gross 
revenue insurance. The second is a more complex model that shows the normative response to 
whole farm insurance policies in Canada (CAIS and AgrInvest) and the U.S. (AGR). Here the 
payout is based on the choice of ALL crops rather than on individual crops. 
 
The base Model 
As a point of comparison the base model excludes all forms of insurance. The objective 
function is to minimize portfolio risk across all states of nature using a discrete state-spaced 
framework. This is distinctively different from the quadratic programming approach used by 
Turvey and Amanor-Boadu that requires the full specification of a positive-definite variance   12
covariance matrix as the objective function. The use of state-spaced programming is required 
because later, when we build the gross revenue and whole farm models, the payouts are 
contingent on the particular states that emerge and not on the means. Furthermore it is assumed 
that only revenue is uncertain, and although the revenue states, R, represent gross margins, the 


















































































Here the subscripts  i and  j  represent crop enterprise and risky state respectively.  , ji R  
represents the state specific revenue for crop i in state   j , and  [ ] i E R  represents the mean net 
revenue across all random states. K  represents a target income level while  j π represents the 
income associated with random state  j . The parameter m indicates the number of random states 
included in the model (in our case  1, 000 m = ) while the parameter n represents the number of 
crop choices or farm enterprises ( 7 n = for Manitoba).  
The critical component to the analysis is the generation of the crop revenues  , ji R . One 
thousand possible revenue outcomes were generated using Monte Carlo simulation. The   13
revenues are based on joint price and yield correlations and are net of any price, yield or revenue 




Gross Revenue Insurance 
Because of the historical interest in gross revenue insurance we also build an 
optimization model to investigate it. In this model all crops have available a gross revenue 
option. Although each of the revenue states are identical to the base model, any shortfalls receive 
payments. Because premiums are marginal each state of nature is net of variable costs, state 
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The term  , ,0 ij i Max Z R ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦  is the crop specific revenue indemnity for state j and 
1, , , ,0 ,0 ,0 ii i j i i m i E Max Z R E Max Z R E Max Z R ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= −= − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  is the revenue insurance 
premium  
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Whole Farm Income Insurance and the AGR Model 
The whole farm insurance model is more complex. The first whole farm model is a 
straight forward portfolio insurance policy that closely resembles the AGR program in the 
United States.  The program provides an indemnity if farm income from all sources falls below a 
pre-specified coverage level. The indemnity, which is priced to be actuarially sound, is equal to 
the expected value of the indemnities across all states of nature. In comparison with the 
enterprise specific models described above and in which portfolio choice is based on insurance 
outcomes known prior to selecting a crop mix, the whole farm approach requires first the 
selection of the crop mix and only then can whole farm insurance premiums be calculated and 
indemnities enumerated. In other words the payouts and premiums are endogenous to the 
optimization problem, whereas with the enterprise approach the payouts and premiums are 
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All notation corresponds to the revenue insurance model described above, except here we 











⎣⎦ ∑  represents the whole farm indemnity payout in any given state of   15
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⎣⎦⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑ ∑  is the premium to be paid 
given loading factor δ . If  1 δ = the whole farm insurance premium is actuarially fair. If 
0.50 δ = the premium is subsidized by 50%.. 
 
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program (CAIS) 
 
The CAIS program was introduced by the Government of Canada as part of the Agricultural 
Policy Framework and as a replacement for the Net Income Stabilization Account program. The 
CAIS program expired in 2007 and a new program comprised of 
AgriInvest+AgStabilize+AgInsure is in place for 2008 and 2009. The newer program is a 
derivative of the CAIS program but with differentiating features that can be economically 
meaningful. 
The CAIS program is a whole farm insurance program which differs only in the 
measurement of payouts and in the premium setting. It is whole farm insurance in the sense that 
all eligible farm enterprises are included in the mix, and payouts are based on the income as a 
whole. This is in comparison to GRIP type programs which provide insurance on its parts. CAIS 
pays out on accrued income (after adjustments for inventory, receivables and payables) and is 
defined by a margin equal to the accrued difference between revenues and eligible expenses. 
Ineligible expenses include capital costs, depreciation, wages, salaries and so on. 
  CAIS is a three-tiered program to protect against income losses below a targeted margin. 
The targeted margin is normally the average margin over the past 5 years although in the present 
formulation the margin is based upon current market risks on a mark-to-market basis. The three 
tiers are mathematically defined as follows: 
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In words, if income falls to within 85% of the elected margin the farmer will receive 50% of the 
shortfall in tier 1. If the margin is below 85% of the elected margin but above 70%, then tier 2 
indemnities pay 70% of the shortfall, and if the margin is less than 70% of the shortfall then the 
farmer will receive an indemnity of 80% of the shortfall. In other words, the more severe is the 
loss the greater weight is put on the indemnity. The final indemnity is equal to the sum of the 
three tiered payouts, but the total payout cannot exceed 65% of the total shortfall below the 
elected margin.  
  The actual legislated premium assigned to CAIS is not actuarially sound. In actuality it is 
defined as   0.85 $55
1,000
Z
v =× + . In other words the legislated premium is tied to the target 
income and not the underlying risk. In addition to evaluating portfolio choice with this premium 
I also investigate portfolio choice if premiums are actuarially sound and subsidized at 50% of the 
actuarial rate. 
 
  The Canadian AgrInvest Policy 
  The 2008 program is to some extent similar to the CAIS program but differs in several 
respects. First, there is no tier 1 payout under the new program. Instead, under AgrInvest, 
farmers can set aside 1.5% of eligible sales into a savings account and this will be matched by 
the Government.  Under AgriStability tier 2 and tier 3 payouts are combined such that any 
shortfall below 85% of margin will be indemnified up to 70% and any negative shortfall would 
be indemnified to 65%. Finally AgrInsure provides for multiple peril crop insurance so that crop 
insurance payouts can be received even if final margins exceed the target margin, but are added   17
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Where  , ˆ
ji i R x  represents net eligible sales. The indemnity can also include crop insurance if there 
is a crop insurance payout but not an AgriStability payout, however in this paper we exclude 
AgrInsure (the optional addition of crop insurance) to focus exclusively on the whole farm 
income component. Note that we do not exclude AgrInvest as a passive benefit. Even though the 
amount invested is contingent on the gross revenue item it is still a benefit tied to production and 
production decisions. It is entirely possible that a variable (random) payout on revenues is not 
neutral and needs to be investigated separately. This is especially true if money is considered 
fungible between savings and investment. 
The critical element with the AgrInvest program is the cost to farmers. In essence, for the 
maximum coverage farmers will pay $4.50 per $1,000 of margin plus a $55 administrative fee. 
For example a margin of $100,000 will cost the farmer only $450 plus $55 = $505, which is 
extraordinarily low for the insurable and investment benefit. (Crop insurance under AgrInsure is 
sold as a separate risk management product.) 
Optimizing the CAIS and AgrInvest programs are however, a simple modification of the 
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Where  j I  are the CAIS benefits as defined above and  [ ] EI δ  is the cost to the farmer with  [ ] EI 
representing the actuarial value of the cost and δ represents a discount or subsidy. 
  
Rotational Constraints 
In addition to the land and income constraints identified in the models constraints were 
also imposed on production. Crop rotational constraints in Manitoba are designed to mitigate the 
emergence of plant diseases. For Manitoba the constraints are a) canola acres can be no more 
than 250 acres and no less than 200 acres; b) flaxseed acres can be no greater than canola acres; 
c) the total of field peas plus lentil acres must equal canola acres; and d) acres planted to hard red 
wheat must exceed acres planted to durum wheat. No constraints were imposed on barley beyond 
the marginal effects of the explicit constraints. Varying target income levels (e.g. $175,000) 
results in different farm portfolios with different risk profiles. Ultimately we seek to understand 
how and to what extent the various agricultural risk management policies could affect portfolio 
choices and management practices.   19
Data and Assumptions 
The representative farm models for Manitoba requires data from multiple sources. The 
approach used in this study differs from most optimization approaches in its use of generating 
random crop price, yield and revenue outcomes with Monte Carlo techniques. The first step was 
to generate correlated prices and yields from distributions ‘consistent’ with observed price 
dynamics (a random walk) and crop yield distributions (normally distributed) for a representative 
Manitoba cash crop farm.  Prices reflect actual conditions in the spring of 2008 and were 
obtained from common media sources and the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange. Drift and 
Volatility measures were obtained from studies conducted by the author as well as from data 
provided at the Winnipeg Commodities Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. It was 
assumed in all cases that the price path over 180 days followed a geometric Brownian motion (a 
random walk). Crop yields were obtained from historical data (Statistics Canada; Manitoba 
Agriculture;). In all cases crop yields were based on provincial averages which were tested using 
Palisades’s Best Fit computer program. Despite findings of non-normality in some studies the 
assumption of normality as an approximation to any of the crop yields could not be ruled out and 
so for convenience, and with no loss in generality, we assumed normally distributed yields for all 
crops. Crop yields represent provincial averages, and while the averages are consistent with 
actual individual farm yields, the standard deviations were not. A study by the author showed 
that on average individual farm yields ranged from about 66% to 125% higher than an ‘average’ 
yield metric. Hence, while keeping mean yields at their historical provincial average all standard 
deviations were increased by 75% 
5 .The data are reported in Table 1. 
  Costs of production (Tables 1) were obtained from cost of production and enterprise 
budgets prepared by the agricultural ministry in Manitoba and are based on an acre basis. Price 
and yield correlations used are reported in Table 2. The costs of Gross Revenue Insurance were 
obtained using Monte Carlo simulation. These are reported in Table 3 and are based on 20,000 
Monte Carlo replications to ensure convergence under the law of large numbers. In the 
                                                 
5 These two assumptions, the normality of yields and the adjustment in standard deviation may be questioned by 
some researchers. While a variety of researchers report that crop yield distributions follow normal or beta or some 
other distribution, in reality no two crop distributions are alike (Turvey and Islam 1995). The use of a beta 
distribution is as questionable as a gamma or for that matter a normal.  What we seek here is a representative 
distribution. Altering the assumptions will not alter the storyline of this paper. Nonetheless, to ensure validity of the 
data used, the author met with a group of Western Canadian farmers in 2008 who were provided the adjusted data as 
well as images of the probability distribution. The farmers examined the distributions and confirmed agreement with 
them as being appropriate and representative.     20
optimization models that follow, only the first 1,000 Monte Carlo iterations were used. Every 
Monte Carlo simulation used the same initial seed so that the all models can be compared 
directly.  
 
Table 1: Manitoba Yields and Prices 













Costs    
      
Manitoba 
 
Hard  red  Tonne  2.38  0.34  6.62 0.24 0.02  149.02 
Durum  wheat  Tonne  2.23  0.40  9.78 0.24 0.02  141.72 
Barley  Tonne  3.03  0.42  4.06 0.19 0.02  139.07 
Dry field peas  Tonne  2.11  0.45  6.22  0.22  0.02  150.73 
Flaxseed  Tonne  1.24  0.20  18.12 0.22 0.02  123.60 
Canola  (rapeseed)  Tonne  1.49  0.23  13.89 0.21 0.02  192.17 
Lentils  Tonne  1.25  0.32  14.02 0.20 0.02  168.24 
   21










































0.521  1.000                       
Barley 
Yield 
0.846  0.598  1.000                     
Dry field 
peas Yield 
0.135  -0.102  -0.275  1.000                   
Flaxseed 
Yield 
0.797 0.321 0.627  0.445  1.000                   
Canola 
Yield 
0.296 0.486 0.557  -0.254  0.100 1.000                 
Lentils 
Yield 
0.801 0.234 0.517  0.464  0.679 0.280  1.000               
Hard red 
Price 




0.174 0.316 0.101  -0.109  0.280  -0.190 -0.023  1.000  1.000           
Barley 
Price 
0.267 0.357 0.213  -0.150  0.362  -0.112 0.017 0.976 0.976 1.000         
Dry field 
peas Price 
-0.192 0.462  -0.101  -0.218 -0.195 0.149 -0.249  0.595  0.595  0.547  1.000       
Flaxseed 
Price 
0.128 0.177 0.154  -0.339  0.117  -0.122  -0.069 0.847 0.847 0.879 0.526  1.000     
Canola 
Price 
0.127 0.114  -0.069  0.285  0.377  -0.236  0.142 0.800 0.800 0.802 0.522  0.762  1.000   
Lentils 
Price 







Table 3: Manitoba Computed Insurance Cost at 80% 
Manitoba Premiums    Hard red  Durum 
wheat 






Manitoba  Revenue  Insurance  80%  10.16 18.02  7.70 14.23 17.74 17.37 26.14 
Manitoba  Revenue  Insurance  90%  17.63 28.97 14.37 21.07 29.40 29.34 35.87 
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Results 
 
We will discuss the results in two steps. First we will use tables 4 and 5 to discuss the 
crop plans and illustrate how different assumptions about farmer behaviour (risk aversion, 
skewness preference) and differing attributes in policy design can affect crop choices. The tables 
themselves obscure some interesting results one of which is the relationship between skewness 
preference and indemnity. We then discuss more broadly the various relationships between risk 
and return and dominance in the context of the E-V and E-S models as well as expected utility 
maximization. 
Table 4 provides the mean-variance results for portfolios ranging from $125,000 to 
$185,000, with and without the subsidy. Here the policy interest is the extent by which farmers 
could alter their farm plan and crop mix in response to targeted income levels and policy 
parameters. All categories are considered relative to the uninsured base case. Without subsidy 
Income Insurance, CAIS and AgrInvest are production neutral in the sense that these plans are 
virtually identical to the base plan. For example at a Target of $145,000 the optimum strategy is 
to grow 38 acres each of hard red and durum wheat, 174 acres of  barley, 250 acres of peas, flax, 
and canola and 0 acres of lentils. The specific mix reflects the income and skewness preferences 
as well as the production constraints. The commodity specificity of GRIP in contrast grows 51 
acres of hard red winter wheat, 51 acres of durum, 196 acres of barley, 203 acres of peas, 234 
acres of flax and canola and 0 acres of lentils
6. The E-V frontiers for base, CAIS and AgrInvest 
models are provided in Figure 1 
The effect of subsidy can also be seen. With a 50% subsidy on premiums the GRIP 
solution includes no wheat, 309 acres of barley, 230 acres of peas, flax and canola and no lentils.. 
The CAIS program reduces flax from 250 to 187 acres while barley increases from 173 acres to 
413 acres. Peas and canola are reduced from 250 acres to 200 acres. Similarly Whole farm 
income insurance grows 416 acres of barley, 200 acres each of field peas and canola and 184 
acres of flax. When the legislated premium is charged for CAIS, a further shift is observed with 
545 acres of winter wheat, 4 acres of durum wheat, 200 acres of peas, 51 acres of flax, and 200  
                                                 
6 To place commodity specificity in context we ran the GRIP model with only wheat and barley targeted for 
insurance.  At $145,000 the final solution was 200.00, 200.00, 0.00, 113.36, 200.00, 200.00, 86.64 acres for hard 
red, durum, barley, field peas, flax, canola and lentils respectively.  With GRIP and insurance targeted to grains 
alone, the portfolio effects are evident.   23
Table 4: Optimum Farm Plans, Manitoba with Constrained Crop Choice. Optimization minimized risk subject to a land, growing constraints,  and 
income constraint. The base case excludes all farm programs. GRIP is a revenue insurance plan that provides indemnities if the individual crop margin 
falls below 80% of specified expected crop margin. Income Insurance is a whole farm insurance plan with whole farm coverage at 80% of target 
income. AgrInvest and CAIS are constructed according to the Canadian Agricultural Income and Stabilization program and its 2008 modification 






Barley Peas  Flax  Canola  Lentils Indemnity  Premium  STD Max  Min Skew 
               
125,000  0  0 450 200 150 200  0      90,960  476,289  -123,626  0.402 
145,000  38  38 174 250 250 250  0      100,360  533,503  -132,776  0.385 
165,000 125 125  0  17 250 250 233      117,077  629,072  -152,300  0.402 
GRIP 50% 
125,000  0  0 491 200 109 200  0  12,031  6,016  74,128  446,895  14,249  1.033 
145,000  0  0 309 230 230 230  0  13,748  6,874  79,253  487,489  38,739  1.072 
165,000  97  97  56 136 250 250 114  16,856  8,428  88,514  537,863  63,525  1.137 
GRIP 100% 
125,000  0  0 451 200 149 200  0  12,441  12,441  75,568  453,148  15,308  1.045 
145,000  51  51 196 203 234 234  30  14,852  14,852  82,647  499,419  40,623  1.101 
165,000 125 125  0  25 250 250 225  18,542  18,542  93,989  552,288  59,574  1.168 
Income 50% 
125,000  0  0 548 200  52 200  0  29,042  14,521  57,573  421,097  85,479  1.802 
145,000  0  0 416 200 184 200  0  29,949  14,974  62,737  475,402  101,026  1.748 
165,000  78  78  93 250 250 250  0  32,642  16,321  69,853  526,519  115,679  1.727 
185,000 125 125  0  0 250 250 250  38,082  19,041  79,967  615,661  128,959  1.756 
Income 100% 
145,000  38  38 174 250 250 250  0  26,353  26,353  72,300  507,150  89,647  1.543 
155,000 125 125  0 209 250 250  41  28,164  28,164  77,369  538,616  95,836  1.556 
165,000 125 125  0  17 250 250 233  31,168  31,168  84,155  597,978  100,832  1.572 
CAIS Legislated 
145,000  545 4 0  200  51  200 0  37,744  708  57,378  474,702  -20,889  1.622 
165,000  0  0 440 200 160 200  0  39,379 798  57,543  468,247  1,859  1.597 
185,000  17  17 216 250 250 250  0  42,820 888  62,040  506,496  10,265  1.603 
205,000 125 125  0 144 250 250 106  47,663 978  69,261  551,657  13,069  1.632 
215,000 125 125  0  8 250 250 242  50,627  1,023  73,934  572,337  11,701  1.620 
CAIS 50% 





Barley Peas  Flax  Canola  Lentils Indemnity  Premium  STD Max  Min Skew 
145,000  0  0 413 200 187 200  0  29,446  14,723  64,648  462,461  -26,650  1.404 
165,000  79  79  92 250 250 250  0  32,700  16,350  71,433  507,734  -22,936  1.421 
184,000 132 132  0  0 245 245 245  37,349  18,674  82,171  555,072  -28,882  1.417 
CAIS 100% 
125,000  0  0 449 200 151 200  0  23,336  23,336  67,346  442,715  -50,359  1.265 
145,000  39  39 173 250 250 250  0  25,897  25,897  73,979  487,268  -45,362  1.277 
165,000 125 125  0  16 250 250 234  30,118  30,118  86,594  542,082  -53,906  1.285 
AgrInvest Legislated 
145,000  0  0 524 200  76 200  0  31,571 610  61,617  451,224  38,070  1.518 
165,000  0  0 393 202 202 202  0  32,982 686  66,535  491,176  50,172  1.491 
185,000 102 102  62 245 245 245  0  36,009 763  73,840  537,519  57,996  1.497 
205,000 125 125  0  12 250 250 238  40,655 839  83,582  582,847  62,855  1.498 
AgrInvest 50% 
125,000  0  0 536 200  64 200  0  25,713  12,856  65,125  434,925  13,882  1.369 
145,000  0  0 405 200 195 200  0  27,017  13,509  70,313  475,666  25,551  1.347 
165,000  96  96  59 250 250 250  0  29,683  14,841  78,452  523,973  31,889  1.348 
180,000 161 161  0  0 226 226 226  33,239  16,620  88,256  564,686  32,945  1.372 
AgrInvest 100% 
125,000  0  0 449 200 151 200  0  22,876  22,876  71,428  452,411  4,142  1.249 
145,000  39  39 173 250 250 250  0  24,866  24,866  78,964  498,276  11,080  1.231 
165,000 125 125  1  15 250 250 235  28,842  28,842  92,127  554,294  11,134  1.251 
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Table 5: Optimum Farm Plans, Manitoba with Constrained Crop Choice. Optimization maximizes skewness  subject to a land, growing constraints,  
and income constraint. The base case excludes all farm programs. GRIP is a revenue insurance plan that provides indemnities if the individual crop 
margin falls below 80% of specified expected crop margin. Income Insurance is a whole farm insurance plan with whole farm coverage at 80% of target 
income. AgInvest and CAIS are constructed according to the Canadian Agricultural Income and Stabilization program and its 2008 modification 






Barley Peas  Flax  Canola  Lentil  Indemnity  Premium  STD Max Min Skew 
base 
125,000 453 147  0  0  0 200  200      103,769  506,812  -149,135  0.469 
145,000 226 226  0 200 147 200 0      103,843  543,938  -136,810  0.450 
165,000 138 138  0  0 241 241  241      117,488  629,914  -152,317  0.409 
GRIP 50% 
125,000  532  68 0 0 0  200  200  15,334  7,667  81,427  480,613  40,062  1.230 
145,000 407  60  0  0 133 200  200  16,281 8,140  85,419  501,383  56,778  1.205 
165,000 245 128  0  0 209 209  209  17,600 8,800  91,312  541,577  62,403  1.185 
GRIP 100% 
125,000  475 87  0  0 38  200  200  15,769  15,769  83,415  482,257  35,593  1.219 
145,000 360  40  0  0 200 200  200  16,628  16,628  86,835  502,517  57,817  1.197 
165,000 138 112  0  0 250 250  250  18,735  18,735  94,448  552,091  61,238  1.175 
Income 50% 
125,009  505  95 0  200 0  200  0  31,464  15,732  60,849  455,246  84,269  1.901 
145,010 317 283  0 200  0 200 0  33,672  16,836  67,715  511,544  99,166  1.874 
165,000 271 271  0  0  58 200  200  37,410  18,705  75,938  546,644  113,293  1.833 
185,000 125 125  0  0 251 250  250  37,240  18,620  80,003  615,922  128,975  1.755 
Income 100% 
125,000 349 251  0 200  0 200 0  27,203  27,203  70,861  491,528  72,797  1.678 
145,000 277 277  0  0  45 200  200  30,729  30,729  80,513  530,862  85,271  1.647 
165,000 138 138  0  0 241 241  241  31,302  31,302  84,490  598,611  100,698  1.579 
CAIS Legislated 
145,000  523  77 0  200 0  200  0  38,219  708  58,548  481,555  -23,574  1.629 
165,000 361 239  0 200  0 200 0  42,047  798  63,099  514,312  -12,399  1.683 
185,000 244 244  0 200 111 200 0  44,654  888  65,420  539,459  4,533  1.709 
205,000 200 200  0  60 200 200  140  48,392  978  70,515  559,115  13,149  1.681 
215,000 132 132  0  0 245 245  245  50,705 1,023  74,065  572,711  11,718  1.625 
CAIS 50% 





Barley Peas  Flax  Canola  Lentil  Indemnity  Premium  STD Max Min Skew 
145,000 307 293  0 200  0 200 0  31,689  15,845  71,529  514,813  -43,421  1.483 
165,000 210 210  0 200 181 200 0  33,317  16,658  73,149  528,378  -23,807  1.488 
184,000 132 132  0  0 245 245  245  37,349  18,674  82,171  555,072  -28,882  1.417 
CAIS 100% 
125,000 452 148  0  0  0 200  200  26,017  26,017  78,413  480,896  -78,042  1.280 
145,000 226 226  0 200 148 200 0  26,753  26,753  77,169  516,078  -49,751  1.353 
165,000 137 137  0  0 242 242  242  30,208  30,208  86,936  542,979  -54,126  1.292 
AgrInvest Legislated 
145,000 480 120  0 200  0 200 0  33,784  610  65,505  500,136  33,612  1.651 
165,000 304 296  0 200  0 200 0  36,150  686  72,017  541,421  43,818  1.633 
185,000 272 272  0  0  56 200  200  39,778  763  80,070  566,264  51,065  1.580 
205,000 136 136  0  0 243 243  243  40,749  839  83,792  583,461  62,852  1.504 
AgrInvest 50% 
125,000  596 4 0 0 0  200  200  28,952  14,476  72,837  470,346  3,649  1.459 
145,000 300 297  0 198  3 200 2  29,635  14,817  76,747  528,371  17,760  1.470 
165,000 259 259  0  0  82 200  200  32,563  16,282  85,473  552,568  23,994  1.421 
180,000 161 161  0  0 226 226  226  33,239  16,620  88,256  564,686  32,945  1.372 
AgrInvest 100% 
125,000 452 148  0  0  0 200  200  26,296  26,296  81,687  490,631  -9,493  1.342 
145,000 277 277  0  0  46 200  200  27,958  27,958  88,415  538,413 -55  1.325 
165,000 137 137  0  0 242 242  242  28,925  28,925  92,454  555,214  11,006  1.258   27
 
 





































Figure 1: E-V Efficient Frontiers. The figure shows the E-V frontiers for the CAIS and AgrInvest programs 
in comparison to the base. The two most leftward frontiers represent the current policy with legislated 
premiums far below actuarial values. The 2
nd and 3
rd curve from the right represent efficiency frontiers with 
the farmer paying 100% of the actuarial premium.  The combined risk reduction and income effects 
discussed in the text are evident. As subsidy increases farmers can accept lower risk portfolios in order to 
achieve the same target income.  
 
 
acres of canola. The skewness impact is evident. The base case solution has skewness of 0.385. 
The GRIP program has an unsubsidized skewness of 1.101 and with the subsidy it is 1.072, 
Downside risk which reaches a minimum of $-167,255 for the base model, increases to $40,623 
with unsubsidized GRIP and $38,739 when subsidized. Likewise, AgrInvest has skewness of 
1.23 with a range of $11,080 to $498,276 when unsubsidized, 1.347 with a range of $25,551 to 
$475,666 when subsidized by 50% and skewness of 1.518 with a range from $38,070 to 
$451,224 when subsidized at the legislated rate. In general, subsidy increases the skewness of the   28
distribution while increasing the lower bound loss. Note that Income Insurance has the highest 
minimum value. Income insurance is the only policy that truly truncates the risk at the 80% 
coverage level. The three-tiered design of CAIS and AgriInvest allows some slippage of 
downside risk. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions for whole farm income 
insurance and GRIP, and illustrates the relationship between risk reduction and premium 
subsidization. 
There are several explanations for these results. The first is when the objective is to 
satisfy a target income, that is a solution constrained by money rather than risk aversion, the 
insurance offsets risk to some degree. On an actuarial basis the mean return with and without 
insurance are the same, but the reallocation of risk permits a different solution. The reduction in 
variance shifts lower moments to higher moments with a concomitant increase in expected 
income, but this shift is offset exactly by the actuarial premium. When the premium is subsidized 
the income effect plays a more dominant role. In order to achieve the stated income the farmer 
can balance insurance payouts against natural risk, but with the subsidy the degree of risk will be 
lower. On the basis of higher risk- higher return a risk-free addition to expected income requires 
that less risk be taken in order to achieve the target. In contrast there are more opportunities to 
exploit risk at the margin with GRIP type programs. That is the tradeoff between enterprise risk 
is stronger with the income effect higher for higher risk crops rather than averaged across all 
crops.  
Table 5 provides the solutions for the skewness model
7. As expected an objective that 
maximizes skewness results in solutions that are quite different from those in Table 4 that 
minimize risk
8. 
                                                 
7 The reader might be interested in the minimize skewness option. Using the base model for $155,000 we get 
()
* 167,70,0,152,264,250,98 x =  with  $109,859 σ = , skewness 0f 0.39, and a range from -$211,238 to 
$575,832. In comparison the maximize solution is  ( )
* 231,231,0,0,138,200,200 x =  with  $115,300 σ = , 
skewness of  0.449 and a range from -$167,255 to $600,003. The equivalent income E-V solution is 
()
* 187,187,27,98,200,200,102 x = ,  $110,492 σ = , skewness of 0.428 and a range from -$151,957 to 
$561,848. Minimizing skewness does not necessarily imply a reduction in downside risk. As can be seen the 
potential loss of $211,238 is far greater than the maximum loss for either the skewness maximization model or the 
E-V model. Repeating the optimization for Income insurance with a 50% subsidy we find the skewness 
minimization model solution is  ()
* 0,0,352,200,247,200,0 x =  and  $97,139 σ = , skewness of 1.68 and a 
range from $108,640 to $495,297. The skewness maximization solution is  ( )
* 344,256,0,0,0,200,200 x = , 
$74,531 σ = , skewness of 1.828 and a range from $105,437 to $549,098. Although the skewness max problem   29




























Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions for base Model, Income Insurance and GRIP at Target Income 
of $155,000. The nature of optimization affects the probability distributions of outcomes. The effect of GRIP 
relative to the base is to reduce the downside risk and because of the subsidy on insurance the GRP CDF lies 
mostly above the base model. Whole Farm Income provides greater risk reduction, with the distribution 
truncated at the 80% of target coverage level. With greater risk reduction the actuarial premium is higher 
for Whole Farm  Income Insurance. The subsidy effect is evident with the Whole Farm Income insurance 
CDF lying above the GRIP CDF. 
 
 
The base model at $145,000 grows 226 acres each of hard red and durum wheat, 0 acres 
of barley, 200 acres of field peas and canola, 147 acres of flax and 0 acres of lentils. The 
standard deviation of this portfolio is $103,843 with an income range from $-136,810 to 
$543,938. . Skewness is 0.450. With AgrInvest the mix without subsidy is 277 acres of hard red 
                                                                                                                                                             
has a lower downside outcome, its  (truncated) standard deviation is lower and the upside is more than $54,000 
higher. 
8 We have also run a set of solutions without the constraints in place. Using the variance minimizing model the 
unconstrained choices in Manitoba include a combination of flaxseed and barley only. For example a target income 
of $175,000 has a minimum risk portfolio comprised of 461 acres of barley and 539 acres of flax. The standard 
deviation of this portfolio is $103,424.    30
and durum wheat, 0 acres of barley and field peas, and 200 acres of canola and lentils. The 
standard deviation is $88,415 with an income range from $-55 to $538,413 and skewness of 
1.325. When subsidized at the legislated rate the solution is 480 acres of winter wheat, 120 acres 
of durum, 200 acres of peas and canola and 0.00 acres of barley, flax and lentils. The standard 
deviation is lower at $65,505 and the range of income, with skewness of 1.651 is from $33,612 
to $500,136 .A similar pattern is found for the other safety net programs.  
 







































Figure 3: Portfolio Skewness With E-S and E-V Solutions. The Figure compares skewness between the E-S 
and E-V models for whole farm income insurance (WFI) , CAIS and AgrInvest. By design the maximization 
of skewness results in higher skewness in all portfolios except the minimum and maximum feasible solutions 
at which E-S and E-V skewness are equal. Skewness is highest for WFI because the income distribution is 
truncated at 80%, whereas the three-tiered design of CAIS and AgrInvest provide indemnities on a different 
scale.  There is greater potential for maximizing skewness under the CAIS program than AgrInvest. 
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Of interest is the general observation that skewness preference has an impact on portfolio 
selection. Optimizing according to skewness tends to increase (in many instances)  standard 
deviation over the mean variance approach and also affects the range with greater clustering 
towards favourable outcomes, even at the expense of accepting some downside risk
9.These 
relationships are shown in Figures 3 and 4.A final point of interest is that  all E-V solutions lie on 
the base E-V frontier while all E-S solutions lie neither on the base E-V nor the base E-S 
frontier. For example under the 50% GRIP E-V solution for $145,000, the equivalent income of 
that plan without revenue insurance is $137,967 with standard deviation $96,337.67, a range 
from $513,872  to -$127,744 and skewness of 0.386. Running the base model for $137,967 
provides an identical outcome. However, for the 50% GRIP E-S solution, the base income for 
that portfolio without the insurance was $136,522 with standard deviation $105,177 , a range 
$537,858 to -$143,755 and skewness of 0.441. The base skewness model optimized to $136,522 
(standard deviation $109,434; range $541,814 to -$153,075; skewness 0.472) did not provide the 
same solution nor did the base E-V model when optimized to the same income level (standard 
deviation $95,588; range $509,506 to -$126,615; skewness 0.389).  This is due to certain 
convexity properties which hold under the E-V rule but not under the E-S rule (see Figure 4).   
 
                                                 
9 As discussed in the text the necessary conditions for  ( ) ( ) g fg f g f and π πμ μ σ σ 〉⇒ = ≤  (see for 
example Eq 2). Our skewness model did not impose this restriction.  However, for completeness we ran several 
optimizations on the base model that included the restriction in the skewness model. No interior solution resulted 
that would have confirmed a dominant TSD solution. Imposing the constraint resulted in solutions identical to the 
base E-V solutions, which is no more than a confirmation that all SSD solutions are part of the TSD set. Likewise 
for the whole farm insurance models. The E-S models with standard deviation constrained was identical to the E-V 
solution.   32
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Figure 4: E-V and E-S Efficiency Frontiers. The figure compares the efficiency frontiers in mean-standard 
deviation space for GRIP and Whole Farm Income Insurance (WFI). These relationships are typical of all E-
V and E-S comparisons. The E-S frontier lies everywhere below the E-V frontier, except at the maximum and 
minimum feasible solutions at which they are equal. Because the E-S frontier lies below the E-V frontier 
portfolio standard deviations are higher, which indicates that the necessary conditions for the skewness 
maximization model to dominate the mean variance model by TSD is not satisfied. Because the condition is 
not sufficient we cannot conclude that the E-S solutions between the minimum and maximum feasible 
solutions either dominate or do not dominate the E-V solutions by TSD. What is clear is that in order to 
optimize positive skewness and hence a higher potential gain in the upper partial moments, decision makers 
will have to accept considerably greater risk. However, because downside risk is reduced or truncated with 
insurance a source if increased variability can be attributed to the spread between the higher upper bound of 
the income distribution that comes with skewness preference. Thus, although portfolio standard deviation is 
higher this does not necessarily imply that the incremental variability is undesirable. What is evident is that 
comparisons across models do satisfy the necessary conditions. Thus we can state that E-S portfolios under 
GRIP or WFI dominate the base model by TSD and that WFI dominates GRIP by TSD but we cannot 
conclude that E-S decisions for GRIP (as an example) dominates E-V decisions by TSD. 
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Constant Absolute Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Maximization 
In the discussion above we observed that in order to meet a fixed target under the E-V rule 
farmers will select lower risk portfolios. How this translates into an expected utility framework is 
discussed in this section. We do this with a simple modification of the objective function by 





σ =− , for variance and 
removing the income constraint.  It is well known that the coefficient of constant absolute risk 
aversion in the expected utility maximization model can be extracted from the shadow price of 
the income constraint from the variance minimization model. For example the implied constant 
absolute risk aversion coefficient extracted from the inverse of the shadow price on the income 
constraint from the base model with a $145,000 income target  is 0.000031757. Applying this 
coefficient to the expected utility maximizing objective will provide an identical result. However 
when applied to the appropriately modified GRIP model the solution yields a utility maximizing 
income of $160,579 with (skewed) standard deviation $90,789. When GRIP is subsidized by 
50% the solution is at $173,809 with a (skewed) standard deviation of $93,678. Likewise, 
optimizing utility with the whole farm income insurance model yielded expected income of 
$152,874 and a (truncated) standard deviation of $78,057 without the subsidy, and $162,544 
with (truncated) standard deviation $79,520 with the 50% subsidy applied. In all cases the 
expected utility model with insurance yielded solutions that were higher on the base E-V frontier 
(i.e higher risk and higher income) than the base solution of $145,000 with equivalent risk 
aversion. Furthermore the riskiness of the portfolios got larger as the subsidy increased. This 
leads us to conclude that agricultural insurance, in general, inhibits risk aversion and encourages 
farmers to take production risks that would not ordinarily be taken in the absence of insurance. 
 
Portfolio Choice and Expected Indemnity 
Tables 4 and 5 also provide the expected indemnities premiums for the income insurance models 
when the insurance is charged an actuarial rate, subsidized by 50% and in the cases of CAIS and 
AgrInvest the much lower legislated rate (between approximately $600 and $900 total). These 
are illustrated in Figure 5. The indemnities reported are the mean insurance payouts that would 
have occurred under each of the programs across the 1,000 states of nature used in the model 
build. Under the indemnity columns the reported values are equal to the actuarial premiums by   34
definition. Under the premiums columns the numbers reported are the total premiums charged 
with 100% indicating that the farmer pays the full premium, 50% for half the actuarial premium 
and then the legislated rate. For example the premium for Income insurance with coverage at 
80% of $145,000 under the risk minimization model would be $26,353 in premium to receive 
$26,353 of expected indemnity. At 50% the premium is $29,949 but the farmer pays only 
$14,974 .The premiums under the legislated plans are, as discussed previously, low and 
unrelated to the actuarial structure of risk. For CAIS at $145,000 the farmer would pay only $708 
to receive $37,744 in expected indemnity and with AgrInvest they would pay only $610 to 
receive $31,571 of expected indemnity. 
The table confirms the various propositions discussed. First, farmers will respond to the 
premium structure. The greater the subsidy the greater will be the willingness of farmers to 
accept strategies with lower downside risk and hence will receive higher expected indemnities
10. 
For example under the EV strategy for CAIS at a target income of $145,000 the expected 
indemnities are $25,897 when the farmer pays the actuarial premium, $29,446 when the 
premium is subsidized by 50% and $37,744 when the much lower legislated premium is charged. 
Second, as target income increases so does the expected indemnity. This is an expected result 
since higher income implies greater risk. For example under AgrInvest with the actuarial rate the 
EV solution shows expected indemnities increasing from $22,876 to $28,842 as target income 
increases from $125,000 to $165,000. Third, at equivalent income levels farmers with skewness 
preference will tend towards solutions that have higher downside risk. But examining Table 5 
this is a tendency and not a generality. Indeed, at least two feasible solutions, that with the lowest 
feasible expected income and that with the highest will result in exact solutions for either risk 
                                                 
10 Maximizing skewness does not necessarily mean the same as maximizing the indemnity, although they are closely 
related. Altering the model to maximize indemnity payouts alters the farm plan. In general maximizing indemnity 
increases the standard deviation and decreases skewness. In other words, one cannot make the claim that 
maximizing skewness is the same as maximizing indemnity. For example with a 50% subsidy maximizing 
indemnity with a target income of $155,000 results in an expected payout of $37,996 compared to $37,090 for the 
E-S solution, but skewness is lower (1.844 vs. 1.861) and portfolio standard deviation is higher ($74,236 vs. 
$73,610). Across all target income levels alternative strategies could be implemented to increase indemnities by as 
much as 9.3% (for $135,000) with an increase in standard deviation of 4.7% and a decrease in skewness of 1.14%. 
Under rational assumptions of expected utility maximizations one could dismiss the idea of indemnity 
maximization, but in more practical terms indemnity maximization could be a feasible strategy for non utility 
maximizers. Of additional interest is the discovery that solutions based on the 
3 σ  measure provide solutions 
identical to the indemnity maximization models for WFI. The reasoning behind the differences, we conjecture, is 
that the skewness measure moderates 
3 σ by the standard deviation. For the base model using 
3 σ  rather than 
skewness resulted in identical strategies.   35
minimizers or skewness maximizers.  The interesting results are with the GRIP solution. In all 
cases, the lower income of  the skewness portfolio is significantly higher than the E-V portfolio. 
With a 50% subsidy and a target of $145,000 the lowest income outcome under E-V is $38,739 
but for the skewness portfolio it is $56,778. This is a differentiating characteristic of commodity 
specific programs which are better able to target risk management in terms of marginal risk 












































Figure 5 Expected Indemnities for E-V Solutions. The figure shows the level of indemnities for E-V solutions 
on AgrInvest, Whole Farm Income (WFI) and GRIP. WFI at 50% and AgrInvest at the legislated premium 
correspond with the higher expected indemnity. For AgrInvest and WFI expected indemnities increase with 
subsidy which strongly suggests that an unintended consequence of subsidy is that farmers will select lower 
income strategies and rely on subsidy to meat target income. This is not the  case for GRIP which shows that 
an increased subsidy actually lowers expected payouts. 
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Discussion, Conclusions, and Policy Recommendations 
This paper has investigated the effects of whole farm income insurance on farm portfolio 
choice. A representative Manitoba farm model was used for crops grown, prices received, inputs 
purchased, and growing conditions including crop rotational constraints. The main problem 
addressed in this study was to determine how safety net programs such as GRIP, Income 
Insurance, CAIS and AgrInvest affected crop choices. To do these two mathematical 
programming models were employed. The first is a mean variance model in which the objective 
is to minimize risk, while the second was developed to maximize skewness. There are two novel 
contributions here. First, the optimization models endogenized the insurance choice. That is, if 
farmers know the parameters of the whole farm insurance policy then it is possible that they 
would alter their management practices to optimize the insurance decision. Hence the model 
employed simultaneously solved for the insurance premium and crop choice. The second is the 
use of a mean-skewness model. It was shown that a utility maximizer with a strong preference 
for skewness would optimize differently than one who minimizes risk. By maximizing skewness 
the farmer would seek strategies that would cluster outcomes to the upside even if this meant 
more variance (albeit truncated or non symmetric) or accepting a greater downside risk, but in 
fewer states. 
  The results provide justification for some concerns raised about the neutrality of these 
programs in the context of decoupling. When unsubsidized, Income insurance, CAIS and 
AgrInvest provide identical solutions to the uninsured strategy. It is the incremental response to 
subsidy that creates the wealth effect that may impact or distort markets. Whether whole farm 
income policies are amber is debatable. On the one hand because there is no specificity in the 
programs,  that is one crop is not specifically targeted over another, whole farm programs are 
seemingly decoupled. The fact that farmers with different degrees of risk aversion, as indicated 
by the election of low versus high target incomes, or with varying degrees of variance 
minimizing or skewness preference would optimize differently, bolsters this argument. On the 
other hand if farmers are generally homogenous in their attitudes towards risk, then many 
farmers optimizing according to the same rules may give the appearance of coupling and thus 
provide cause for a complaint under WTO.  
On a more pragmatic level the methods employed in the study may too provide some 
benefits. The existing AgrInvest program uses the past five years of production history and tax   37
filer information to establish margin. The data simulation in this paper applied Monte Carlo 
simulations to correlated prices and yields with prices modeled as a random walk and yields 
assumed normal. The idea of using a random walk is a departure from the historical 5-year 
performance stated in the legislation. Nonetheless the use of mark-to-market prices in the 
simulation ensures that whatever the portfolio outcomes they are based on current price paths 
and risk and are not distorted by historical precedent. 
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